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I
INTRODUCTION

Terry Moe and Scott Wilson's article Presidentsand the Politics of Structure1
develops and refines a theme that Moe's work has emphasized: the importance
of the president and, correspondingly, the incompleteness of models of the
political process that focus on Congress and leave only a shadow role for the
president as the exerciser of veto power. The purpose of the article is to
supplement the McNollGast structure and process explanation of congressional
establishment of administrative agencies 2 by elaborating the president's
countervailing institutional motivation to strengthen and consolidate the
bureaucracy under presidential control.
I find Moe and Wilson's thesis highly suggestive and one which ought to be
pursued and amplified. My comment consists of three points directed at
exploring their thesis further. The first two concern two institutions that are
omitted from the analysis but whose inclusion might well alter some of Moe and
Wilson's conclusions on comparative institutional advantages-political parties
and courts. These institutions offset some of the collective action problems that
Moe and Wilson ascribe to Congress. The third point identifies lines of empirical
inquiry which could make more compelling the president-centered explanation
of the politics of agency structure offered by Moe and Wilson, by following up
on what impact their three case studies of bureacratic reform favored by
presidents have had on the formulation of public policy.
II
POLITICAL PARTIES

A key institutional device in resolving collective action problems and
coordinating individual members of Congress, and indeed, in coordinating the
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Congress and the president, is the political party. This institution does not
appear in Moe and Wilson's analysis. While there has been disagreement in the
literature over the vibrancy of parties,3 if the consolidating role of political
parties is taken into account, much of the president's institutional advantage as
a unitary actor that is emphasized in Moe and Wilson's article disappears. It
would therefore be useful to examine whether Congress's organization into
parties leads members to support institutional (as opposed to individual) utilitymaximizing strategies, or whether party discipline causes members (of the
president's party) to support the presidency against their institutional interests.
Inclusion in the analysis of the role of parties raises the question whether
divided government-government when the president's party does not control
Congress-affects Moe and Wilson's analysis. It is possible that the presence or
absence of divided government better accounts for the article's stories of
congressional indifference, support, and opposition to presidential efforts at
regulatory reform than does the article's interest group explanation. President
Carter, a Democrat whose party controlled both houses of Congress, appears to
have successfully restructured agencies more easily than did the Republican
presidents in the article's vignettes. Is the interaction of a party variable of
importance as an explanatory variable, in addition to the interest group concerns
mentioned by Moe and Wilson? If party, and hence divided government, is a
factor in successful agency reform, we would expect to find a President Carter
or Clinton more successful than a President Reagan or Bush. If, however, it is
found that Carter and Clinton do no better than Republican presidents in the
effort at restructuring the bureacracy, then Moe and Wilson's approach excluding
parties from the analysis, and treating the unitary actor-president as possessing
a clear-cut institutional advantage, would be more compelling. Bringing parties
into the analysis would enable us to get a better handle on the significance of the
institutional advantage of the presidency that Moe and Wilson ascribe to its
unitary actor characteristic.
Another aspect of the president's institutional advantage over Congress
identified in the article that would benefit from a closer look is the proposition
that presidents are less motivated by, or less interested in, reelection than are
members of Congress (and thus want a strong bureaucracy despite interest
groups' contrary desires).4 In particular, an attempt ought to be made to
determine whether differential reelection concerns matter. Do presidents more
vigorously assert their branch's power in agency shaping in their first or second
terms? Are members of Congress with safer seats, or senators whose reelection
is further down the line, more likely to support either presidential agendas for
agency reform or institutional reform that strengthens Congress's control of an
agency at interest groups' expense? If there is no connection between reelection
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opportunities and positions on agency reform, then this institutional advantage
may be less potent than the article suggests.
III
COURTS

Perhaps because it tends to interest lawyers more than political scientists, the

judicial branch of government is also omitted from the analysis. Yet inclusion
of their interaction in the administrative process may affect the institutional
equilibrium favoring the president that Moe and Wilson describe. The question
is whether courts protect Congress-or to put it more precisely, whether
Congress successfully uses courts, in structuring administrative agencies, as in the
McNollGast structure and process scenario, 5 to protect its interests in agency
decisionmaking? If courts can play such a role in monitoring agency action, then
Congress will not be overly concerned about presidential efforts to assert
political control over the bureaucracy. This puts a different gloss on the three
case studies in the article.
Introducing courts in an agency's structure does present difficulties for
Congress, however. Presidents shape courts through the appointment power.
In addition, life tenure strengthens the judiciary's independence as a political
actor. I have no intuition concerning how, in Moe and Wilson's framework,
courts affect the balance of power between Congress and the president in the
competition to shape agencies. Information on the positions presidents take in
legislative proposals on agency structure on issues such as judicial review or on
access to court would provide evidence at least of how presidents perceive their
interests to be affected by courts. If presidents were not hostile to judicial
involvement, I would have fewer misgivings over the courts' exclusion from the
analysis.
IV
FURTHER EMPIRICAL INQUIRY

An alternative to Moe and Wilson's presidential institutional advantages
explanation for the presidential successes in the politics of agency structure, is
that none of the changes discussed in the article diminished congressional power.
That is, the changes did not alter the balance of power between Congress and
the president with respect to agency agendas or actions. This explanation is
consistent with the congressionally dominated McNollGast view of agencies as
Moe and Wilson characterize it. If this alternative hypothesis is correct, then
Congress's quiescent approval of presidents' agency reforms is evidence not of
an institutionally advantaged presidency but of a Congress that shapes agencies
in its image.
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Moe and Wilson contend, for instance, that President Carter's 1978 civil
service reforms were significant because they enabled the President to assert
control over agencies.6 We can measure, albeit crudely, how important this
legislation was. Was there a change in bureaucratic output post-1978 in favor of
the president's position over Congress, or that harmed the interest groups of
concern to Congress and thus benefitted the president at Congress's expense?
Does the president now exercise more control over the bureaucracy than
presidents did prior to 1978? Are career bureaucrats, compared to political
appointees, less powerful in agency decisionmaking than before? Moe and
Wilson's contention would be bolstered if evidence of this sort was brought to
bear on the analysis. Congress's acquiescence in President Carter's reform
proposal is meaningful evidence of an institutional advantage only if the reform
has real policy consequences.
The same interpretative issue over the absence of congressional resistance to
presidential efforts at agency reform can be raised concerning the article's two
other examples. One might examine, for instance, whether the Bureau of the
Budget was more responsive to Congress's desires than those of the president
prior to the OMB reforms. If there is no difference, before and after, then
congressional approval of the change was, again, costless. Finally, consider the
article's evaluation of the regulatory review case history. Moe and Wilson
criticize Congress for continuing to fund agencies responsible for regulatory
review because by doing so Congress enhanced the president's power, by
"bur[ying] the EPA still further in bureaucracy" rather than "stop[ping] the
president in his tracks."7 This end-product of bureaucratic ineffectiveness might,
however, be precisely what Congress wanted; given the congressional interest in
maintaining the status quo for the benefit of the interest groups it serves as
detailed by Moe and Wilson, retaining the status quo through regulatory review
could be more consistent with Congress's institutional interest than Moe and
Wilson recognize.
Apart from examining whether agency outputs change after the occurrence
of administrative reforms favoring the presidency, there is another line of
inquiry, using cross-sectional data, that would bolster Moe and Wilson's
hypothesis that the president is of primary importance in shaping U.S.
bureaucracies. How different is the structure and process of U.S. agencies
compared to agencies in parliamentary systems such as the United Kingdom and
Canada? Are U.K. bureaucracies more effective than those of the United States,
as the article's thesis implies? In the past, Moe has outlined organizational
differences across political systems in order to demonstrate that his analysis of
the power of the presidency is correct In this article, however, no comparative
institutional data are offered to support the authors' hypotheses about the kind
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of bureaucracy produced by the interaction of the institutional presidency and
Congress. Undertaking a comparative institutional analysis of bureaucracies
across political systems is important if we are to move further in developing a
positive political theory of agency structure.
V
CONCLUSION

There is a strong consensus among those who study administrative agencies
that Moe and Wilson's core thesis-that the president has a major role in the
politics of agency structure, and this role is importantly defined by institutional
factors rather than personalities-is accurate. In this regard, Moe and Wilson's
article is a valuable antidote to a congressionally centered political science
literature. But in addition to developing more realistic formal models of the
politics of agency structure with richer characterizations of the presidency, we
need to work on microanalytic studies of agencies to delineate better the
respective roles of the president and Congress in influencing agency structure,
and the conditions under which the institutional advantages of the presidency are
capitalized on and converted into policy successes.

